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Nashville and Mobile
W h ile  Sherman besieged Savannah,  General 
Thom as  at Nashville  fought w ha t  some have 
called the “decisive battle of the w ar ."  Unable  to 
stop Sherman, H ood  had turned his arm y against 
T hom as at Nashville. A C onfedera te  victory 
there would have freed H ood  s a rm y to proceed 
east to help Lee.
Thomas, after the fall of Atlanta, had been 
sent into Tennessee to stop Hood. W hen  Hood 
moved toward Nashville, Thomas began to gather 
an army there to stop him. The division under 
A. J. Smith, following the victory at Tupelo, had 
been sent to Missouri to hunt for Price, as so 
many other armies had done. On October 29. 
while Smith was in western Missouri, Grant or­
dered him to hurry to Nashville to help Thomas. 
A forced march of fifteen days brought Smith to 
St. Louis, where he rested his men until Novem­
ber 23, when they boarded steamboats for the trip 
to Nashville. W Th Smith were the 12th, 27th, 
32nd, and 35th Iowa Infantry regiments and the 
2nd Iowa Artillery. At Nashville, with Major 
General James H. W ilson’s cavalry, were the 2nd, 
5th, and 8th Iowa Cavalry.
Meanwhile, Sherman had sent Scofield’s 23rd
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Army Corps to Thomas, and on November 30, 
1864, Scofield had met Hood at Franklin, south of 
Nashville, and defeated him. Scofield then retired 
to Nashville, and on December 1 Smith arrived. 
Thomas now had 55,000 men to meet the expect­
ed attack from Hood, who had only about 25,000.
‘Smith’s Guerrillas were a cocky lot with su­
preme confidence in their commander. One 
bearded veteran is quoted as saying: “W e ’re 
A. J. Smith's guerrillas.
W e ’ve been to Vicksburg,
Red River, Missouri and 
about everywhere else . . . 
and now we re going to
Hades if old A. J. orders 
»»
us.
At Nashville, Thomas 
had the cavalry under 
Wilson; the detachment of 
the Army of the Tennessee 
under Smith; the 4th Army 
C o r p s  under General 
Thomas J. W ood;  the 23rd 
Army Corps under Sco­
field; and a number of miscellaneous regiments. 
Hood had three corps commanded by Generals 
Benjamin F. Cheatham, Alexander P. Stewart, 
and Stephen D. Lee. Most of Forrest’s cavalry 
had been sent to Murfreesboro to destroy the 
railroad there. In addition, H ood’s army had
Gen. A. J. Smith
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been considerably weakened by the loss of manv 
of its officers at the battle of Franklin. His lines 
at Nashville were considerably shorter than 
Thomas’ and less well fortified.
Nashville was surrounded by a chain of forts, 
connected by rifle pits and earthworks, and with 
heavy guns mounted in the forts. As the troops 
gathered at Nashville, they were assigned posi­
tions in this defensive network. While  Grant 
waited anxiously for news of Thomas, that gen­
eral, with his usual deliberateness, prepared for 
the attack. By December 9 he was ready, but an 
ice storm struck Nashville, making any movement 
impossible until December 13. Grant, impatient of 
the delay —  he never had liked Thomas —  was 
ready to relieve him from command when the 
word of victory came.
Thomas had placed his men in an arch before 
Nashville, reaching from the Cumberland River 
on each side of the city and pushing out in the 
center toward the Confederate position. Thus, he 
flanked Hood on both the right and left. Thomas’ 
left was to feint at Hood’s right, while his right, 
where he had the cavalry and Smith’s detach­
ment, was to left wheel against Hood s left. De­
cember 15 dawned dark and foggy; not until 10 
A. M. could the troops advance as planned. 
Thomas, on a hilltop in front of Nashville, where 
he could see the whole battlefield, watched the 
Union blue move forward relentlessly against
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Hood s flanks on the right, while the Union left 
kept the Confederate right occupied. Soon 
H ood’s left began to crumble, and a steady 
stream of prisoners moved toward the Union lines 
—  so many at one time that the troops lying in the 
reserve thought an enemy attack was imminent. 
By the end of the day some 1,200 prisoners and 
16 guns had been taken, and Hood had retired 
several miles to a line of fortified hills.
On the following day, H ood’s shortened line 
was anchored on his left on Shy’s Hill, protected 
by a stone wall. Smith’s first and second brigades 
tried repeatedly to storm the hill, only to be 
thrown back time and again. Meanwhile, the 
third brigade watched. One of the members of 
the 1 2th Iowa later described the famous charge 
which followed: “W e  could stand it no longer
and away we went as one man; it seemed as 
though every man in the Regiment and Brigade 
started instantaneously. I have never seen a man 
yet who heard an order to start on that charge. 
Rushing through muddy fields, the brigade 
reached the wall where it had been breached and 
a cannon placed, trained on the oncoming Yan­
kees. A Confederate major stood alone at the 
cannon, ready to fire, but before he could pull the 
lanyard he was overwhelmed by the Iowa men in 
the advance. Turning the cannon around, they 
fired the prepared shot at the now retreating 
enemy.
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This charge broke the back of the Confederate 
resistance, and Hood s army retired in confusion, 
with Thom as’ men hard after them. A steady De­
cember rain soon reduced the roads, trampled by 
soldiers, horses, and wagons, to a deep mire, and 
although Thomas tried to pursue Hood as far as 
possible, he found the movement too slow to catch 
the flying enemy. On December 30 he abandoned 
the chase. The remnants of H ood’s army retreat­
ed into Mississippi, completely destroyed as an 
army.
Thom as’ losses at Nashville were only 3,061 — 
not heavy, considering the numbers engaged. 
The Iowa regiments also did not suffer as much as 
they had in previous battles: 9 killed, 94 wound­
ed for a total of 103.
Smith’s ‘detachment,’ as it was now desig­
nated. returned to Memphis, and in February, 
1865, was transferred to the Military Division of 
W es t  Mississippi at New Orleans, now under 
command of Major General Edward R. S. Canby. 
Mobile, long an objective of both Grant and 
Sherman, was C anby’s destination. His orders 
were to move from the Gulf Coast toward Selma 
or Montgomery, Alabama, and to capture Mobile. 
Besides the Iowa regiments with Smith, there 
were seven with the 13th Army Corps under M a ­
jor General Gordon Granger: the 19th, 20th,
21st, 23rd, 29th, 33rd, and 34th.
On March 5 the troops left New Orleans by
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boat and converged on Mobile Bay. Mobile, situ­
ated on the west shore of the bay, was protected 
on the east side by several forts, including Span­
ish Fort and Fort Blakely, the two most impor­
tant. On March 20 the troops landed and moved 
up toward Spanish Fort, their first objective. 
Here, a member of the 12th Iowa overheard a con­
versation between Generals Canby and Smith, in 
which “Old A. J. further endeared himself to his 
men:
Canby said to Smith. General, i understand your men 
sometimes take things that do not belong to them.” Smith 
replied. Yes, by G— d—, we will take Mobile, and it 
don’t belong to my men.” Canby replied: "No, no, not 
that.” Smith: W e l l ,  then, what is it?” Canby: “Why 
my cook procured a half dozen turkeys last night, and 
put them in a coop beside my tent, and this morning I 
find four of them have been taken.” Smith: “Couldn’t
have been my men, not my men; they would have taken 
them all. taken them all!”
While part of Canby’s army besieged Spanish 
Fort, troops under General Frederick Steele a r ­
rived overland from Florida and invested Fort 
Blakely, six miles to the north. Smith’s 16th 
Corps was on the right of the line besieging Span­
ish Fort, while Granger’s 13th Corps was on the 
left.
T h e  siege lasted thirteen days, during which 
there was much skirmishing and artillery firing. 
But the forts were strong, and the attacking
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LInion army suffered many losses. Finally, Canby 
prepared for a general assault on April 9. During 
the preceding afternoon, a heavy bombardment 
hammered Spanish Fort. Linder cover of this at" 
tack, the 8th Iowa on the extreme right, com­
manded by Lieutenant Colonel William B. Bell 
was ordered forward to advance the LInion line. 
Heavily attacked, the regiment, instead of in­
trenching on a ridge as they had been ordered, 
continued right on into the fort itself. One Iowa 
regiment thus took the fort which had held out for 
so long. Smith and Granger now went to the sup­
port of Steele at Fort Blakely, and on the evening 
of April 9 the combined forces took Fort Blakely. 
T w o days later Mobile was evacuated.
The troops at Mobile did not know for several 
days that on the very day that Fort Blakely fell, 
Lee had surrendered to Grant at Appomattox 
Court House in Virginia. The last great battle of 
the war had been fought.
The Iowa losses at Mobile were not heavy. Of 
the 1,678 casualties in Canby’s army, only 175 
were Iowans. Of these, 51 were in the 8th Iowa:
8 killed and 43 wounded. The 8th, which had be­
gun its army service at Shiloh, where almost the 
entire regiment had been captured after its strong 
stand in the “Hornet’s Nest, had closed its ca­
reer brilliantly in its charge on Spanish Fort.
